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Abstract 
We examine the role of the modern firm in generating income inequality. Specifically, we 
consider the growth in the use of asset-based rewards for senior executives, combined 
with continued use of salaries and wages for other employees, and the impact this has 
on measures of inequality within firms.  Our paper presents data on intra firm inequality 
from the UK FTSE 100 for the period 2000-2015. It looks at ratios of CEO to average 
earnings and attempts to explain both the growth in inequality on this measure and the 
extent of variance between firms. It distinguishes between a period of “administered 
inequality” up to the early 1980’s when intra-firm processes defined differential pay and 
a subsequent one of “outsourced inequality” when capital market measures dominate 
executive pay. In the latter period, intra firm inequality measures are defined by upward 
movements in capital market measures and the extent of outsourcing of low paid work. 
 
Keywords: Executive compensation; Intra-firm inequality; Salaries & wages  
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1. Introduction 
 
There appears to be a broad consensus that inequality of income within modern firms is 
greater in the modern era, specifically since the widespread adoption of performance-
based pay for senior executives, particularly in the UK and USA. In this paper we deal 
primarily with the UK. (For the US see Garicano & Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). In popular 
accounts, pay inequality is often described in simple ratio terms, for example CEO pay 
expressed as a multiple of average, median, or lowest pay within the firmi. “CEO pay” is 
generally taken to refer not merely to salary, but to leveraged packages in which major 
elements might be viewed in economic terms, strictly speaking, as assets or capital gains 
rather than income. Income inequality within firms is also seen as a general phenomenon, 
even though data exist for the UK, presented below, to indicate that these multiples vary 
across firms and standard industry classification categories.  Although there has been 
wage stagnation in UK for some periods since the financial crisis, the growth in inequality 
is often seen primarily to stem from increases in executive compensation, rather than 
from cuts to nominal or real earnings at the base of the income pyramid.   
       In this paper, we examine the intra-firm processes that accompany the growth in 
inequality within firms. Specifically, we ask the following question - what have been the 
changes to the organisational processes that generate inequalities of income within firms, 
and how do they relate to the increase in intra-firm inequality? Where relevant we use 
data relating to UK FTSE100 companies to illustrate our points. We begin in Section 2 by 
reviewing the literature on changes to the management of large firms; this literature 
focuses on the “financialisation” of the firm (Davis, 2009), particularly in the US and UK, 
which stresses the importance of capital market oversight in determining change to firm 
structures and processes. It emphasises, in particular, moves away from organisational 
towards market influences on employment practices. In Sections 3 and 4, we attempt to 
extend this literature by arguing that there are in fact two sets of changes of importance 
for intra-firm inequality. The first consists of the erosion of administrative solutions to 
inequality and the second consists of a move to greater reliance on market forces. It is 
crucial that this involves reliance not only on labour market forces but also capital market 
forces – the two markets work very differently.  Section 5 illustrates the growth in intra-
firm inequality using data from the UK. These data show that a reliance on capital market 
measures for executive pay and labour market measures for low pay exacerbates intra-
firm inequality. The section also examines sectoral variance on one measure of intra-firm 
inequality. Section 6 discusses implications and concludes.  
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2. Managerial capitalism? 
 
One of the more pervasive ideas in the business strategy literature is Alfred Chandler’s 
concept of “managerial capitalism” (Chandler, 1962, 1977). Based initially on rather 
casual empiricism, this came to denote a set of circumstances underpinning the operation 
of large oligopolistic corporations in which managerial freedom of action was pronounced, 
in the absence of regulation by either government or capital markets. Chandler was not 
the first to make the observation. Peter Drucker argued that the managerial corporation 
was “the decisive, representative and constitutive institution” of the US social order 
(Drucker, 1954: 22). Wright-Mills (1956) was concerned with the emergence of a 
managerial “power elite” in the US. Later Vogel (1978: 58) argued: “In the US, the 
professionally managed, oligopolistic, multi-divisional firm literally exists for a generation 
without the modern equivalent of the state.” 
       More recently, Davis (2009) saw the traditional US corporation as an institution that 
fulfilled many of the functions of states – dispensing or funding social welfare benefits 
such as health care, running internal procedural justice systems like internal courts, 
developing foreign policies about where they do business, and in some cases having their 
own air fleets - see also Anderson (2017) who argues that large employers operate like 
unelected states in the way that they control the lives of employees. As Davis remarks: 
“some American multi nationals look more like European welfare states than does the US 
government” (Davis, 2009: 59). British business differed in some respects, but not in the 
basic picture of a set of often vertically integrated corporations run primarily by managerial 
agents rather than owners, and with their internal processes insulated from direct 
regulation by government (Channon, 1973).  
       There is a substantial literature documenting the decline of managerial capitalism, 
particularly since the liberalisation of financial markets in the 1980s. Much of it relates to 
the USA. Pfeffer (1997) argues that firms have on average become smaller, more 
unequal, with much changed employment practices and with much more severe capital 
market oversight. Davis (2009) argues that firms are “managed by markets”, specifically 
that they are driven by the conception of shareholder value to maximise their market value 
and minimise their direct ownership of assets. Krippner (2012) shows that US firms are 
increasingly reliant for revenue and profits on financial activities such as ownership of 
common stocks, lending and asset management, whatever specific product markets they 
inhabit. 
       What were the implications for intra firm inequality? Again, the published data come 
mainly from the US.  Davis and Cobb (2010) argue that there are relationships between 
the market for corporate control in the firm and inequality.  For the US, they identify three 
broad periods: 
• 1950s-1970s: the “high tide” of managerial capitalism where conglomerate 
mergers increased employment concentration and inequality declined; 
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• 1980s: when bust-up takeovers split up these conglomerates and inequality 
increased slightly; 
• 1990s: when the “shareholder value” approach dominated and inequality 
increased rapidly. 
       Perhaps paradoxically, managerial independence of action is associated with more 
limited intra-firm inequality in income, although not necessarily in other forms of 
inequality. It is interesting to note how these time frames map onto the data on income 
inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries for the period 1910-2010 provided by Piketty and 
others (see Cassidy, 2014). This shows a distinct “U” shape, with the share of the top 
percentile in total income falling  from 1910, the early days of managerial capitalism, to 
1970 and rising thereafter, so that by 2010 inequality had almost regained levels not 
previously seen since the start of the 20th Century.  
       Davis (2009) is concerned primarily to analyse the death of managerial capitalism in 
the USA and its replacement by an approach to corporate governance characterised by 
a devotion to shareholder value. This in turn implies a lively market for corporate control, 
divestment of non-essential activity, and alignment of manager and shareholder interests 
through the use of stock options. In his words: “the corporation has increasingly become 
the financially-oriented nexus described by its theorists” (Davis, 2009: 63). It is perhaps 
in analysing what these theorists, primarily in economics and finance, saw as the 
problems of managerial capitalism that we may find a clue to its relevance for inequality. 
In its key contributions (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and the collection in Jensen, 
1998) the essential focus is on share-price underperformance rooted in managerial 
behaviour. The argument goes back to the work of Williamson (1975, 1985) and it is at 
core an agency problem. Managers, it goes, act in their own interests not those of 
shareholders, they are risk averse in under-utilising assets, preferring organisational 
survival over investor returns, pursuing growth rather than profitability, and over valuing 
their own competence over market signals. They prioritise predictability and security over 
maximising returns. 
       The shift away from managerial capitalism to the financialised firm is associated with 
major shifts in employment practices, broadly from what Jacoby (2005) has termed an 
“organisational” to a “market” orientation.  The former is associated with job security, 
internal hiring, talent development and full time employment relationships. As Bidwell, 
Briscoes, Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling (2013: 62) have put it, it was “an employment 
system that was closed, inwardly focused and hierarchically governed”. The latter is 
associated with market- based pay, use of incentives, shorter job tenure, and non-
standard employment contracts. Crucially, the former is associated with concerns for 
internal equity in pay relationships, whereas the latter is associated with greater pay 
variance within and across jobs (see also Cobb, 2016).  
       The argument here is that this relates to the mechanisms for control of intra-firm 
inequality preferred under managerial capitalism. We shall refer to this here under the 
broad heading of “Administered Inequality”. This is not to imply that firms had a view about 
the desirability of specific inequality outcomes, rather that managerial capitalism exhibited 
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a preference for organisational outcomes dominated by intra-organisational processes. 
Inequality outcomes are included here. We may, at the risk of oversimplification, suggest 
two sets of administrative processes in the managerial corporation, both of which set 
limits on inequality outcomes.  
 
 
3.  Administered Inequality 
 
The story of administered inequality is essentially a story about internal labour markets. 
Internal labour markets, whether for manual, white collar or managerial categories of 
employee are multipurpose devices that develop job-specific skills, rationalise hierarchies 
and, crucially, provide a legitimation device for inequality (Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 
1993; Doeringer & Piore, 1971). They tend to compress pay disparities (Cobb, 2016: 
332). They also prioritise the internal coherence of hierarchy over market mechanisms 
for pay setting. We focus on the two mechanisms for pay setting most common in 
managerial corporations: collective bargaining and job evaluation. They have often 
overlapped, but are distinct. Both tend to exert limits on intra firm inequality. Crucially, 
they both involve the firm in offering some justification for inequality outcomes.   
 
Collective Bargaining 
In both USA and UK, union density increased throughout the early part of the era of 
managerial capitalism. It peaked at just under 30% in USA in the early 1960s, but 
continued to rise in UK until 1980, peaking at nearly 55%. In the UK, although public 
sector trade union membership density increased rapidly in the 1970s, private sector 
union membership and collective bargaining coverage was substantial through the post 
war period to 1980 (Gomez, Bryson, & Willman, 2010). Unionisation and the emergence 
of internal labour markets for manual workers tend to be more closely associated in the 
USA than UK (Doeringer & Piore, 1971), but in both countries there is evidence to 
associate collective bargaining with the compression of pay differentials; specifically, 
unionised workplaces show lower wage dispersion than non-unionised (Freeman & 
Medoff, 1984; Metcalf, Hansen, & Charlwood, 2001). Collective bargaining appears to 
have compressed differentials not just within bargaining units but between them. Bain, 
the most influential theorist on the growth of white collar and managerial unionism, saw 
the extension of unionisation into clerical and managerial occupations as a “credit” effect 
on the success of manual trades unionism at protecting real incomes (Bain, 1970). There 
is more recent evidence, based on US S&P 500 data, indicating that the presence of 
unionism exerts a downward effect on senior management pay; i.e. the impact of unions 
on intra-firm inequality extends well beyond the scope of collective bargaining 
agreements to embrace both the level and composition of senior management pay 
(Gomez & Tzoumis, 2006). 
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       In both countries, the period of the rapid break up of managerial capitalism identified 
by Davis (the 1980s) saw a sustained decline in union density (Gomez et al., 2010). Union 
density tends to understate collective bargaining coverage but both density and coverage 
tend to be greater in larger firms (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Successive survey evidence 
for the UK from the Warwick Employment Relations Dataset (WERS) shows that union 
membership and coverage of collective bargaining fell consistently from the 1980s. 
Between 1989 and 2014, union density fell overall from 38% to 25% (van Wanrooy et al., 
2013). By 2013, collective bargaining coverage in the private sector in the UK stood at 
only 16% (Labour Force Survey data). As we show below, pay determination at the base 
of the organisational pyramid has a very different underlying process in most modern 
firms.   
 
Job Evaluation 
Job evaluation is defined by Armstrong and Taylor (2003: 4) as: 
 A systematic process for defining the relative worth or size of jobs within an 
organization in order to establish internal relativities and provide the basis for 
designing an equitable grade and pay structure, grading jobs in the structure and 
managing relativities  
Its coverage in the UK has been substantial, not least because the idea of an equitable 
measurement of job content and worth has relevance for the implementation of equal pay 
and equal opportunities legislation (Boxall & Purcell, 2003). Similar legal considerations 
seem to have been behind the spread of internal labour markets in USA (Dobbin et al., 
1993). A key point of job evaluation is that it does not measure the market value of a job 
incumbent, simply the content and thus the relative worth of the job - it is a measure of 
the assessed value of inputs.  
       Historic data on coverage of job evaluation are patchy. A major trigger to collection 
of such data was the operation of incomes policy in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Many 
instances of incomes policy allowed exemptions from pay constraints where jobs were 
either seen to be unfairly paid compared to similar ones or where the content of a job was 
seen to have changed. Job evaluation techniques legitimised such claims to exceptional 
treatment (Hyman & Brough, 1974; Willman, 1982). A second trigger way the operation 
of the Equal Pay Act from December 1975. The Act made gender discrimination on pay 
unlawful under certain circumstances; equal pay was defined by reference to ‘similar 
work’ and job evaluation data were admissible, perhaps central, to equal pay claims (Paul 
& Edwards, 1977). 
       The National Board for Prices and Incomes, a government body concerned with the 
implementation of incomes policy, estimated very high coverage in 1968 based on a 
sample survey. Particularly in large firms and oligopolistic industries, the majority of large 
firms had job evaluation for non-manual employees; statistics for the coal, tobacco and 
chemical industries show coverage of over 60%. The Boards estimated over 30% of 
managerial jobs were covered nationally (NBPI, 1968). Later government surveys in 1973 
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and 1974 show job evaluation present in 63% of sampled establishments (cited in Craig, 
1977). A further survey by the Institute of Personnel Management in 1976 estimated 79% 
establishment coverage.  
       Surveys cited in Armstrong and Taylor (2003: 7-9) show coverage levels of 45-50% 
in surveyed firms 1995-2002, with many non-covered firms expressing intent to adopt. It 
is significant that job evaluation was commonly used for executive and managerial posts 
as well as clerical and blue collar jobs. 
       Job evaluation is often based on proprietary packages sold by management 
consultants. By far the largest of these in the UK is the Hay guide chart method, which 
does two things. First, it scores any job in terms of a set number of points. Second, it 
assigns a financial value to each point - its objective is to establish a uniform value for a 
Hay point across firms, using a proprietary database. Since a point is worth the same in 
lower and senior management jobs, this exerts an influence on the relative pay of jobs - 
it dampens kurtosis at the upper end of the income distribution. A CIPD survey in 1994 
found 30% of all job evaluation usage in the UK was by the Hay method.  
       A significant case study was the retail banking industry. Dominated by four large 
banks, the industry adopted the Hay method on the establishment of national collective 
bargaining in 1967. The scheme covered clerical work and a ‘managerial minimum’ 
salary. During the 1970’s, the scheme was extended across the managerial hierarchy as 
incomes policy norms required justification of pay increases (Morris, 1986, and personal 
communication). 
       The effect of such a method is to control variance in income, but only within the scope 
of the scheme. It is thus significant that the Hay scheme often covered very senior 
management positions, notably in retail banking in the UK. Where salary is defined for 
senior managers by this system, and where salary is the major component of total 
income, then inequality will be constrained by this sort of administrative process. 
However, where senior managers, for whatever reason, reach escape velocity from such 
a scheme, or where the outputs of the scheme are only a small proportion of pay, 
inequality within the management hierarchy will increase. 
       Let us illustrate with a hypothetical example. Firm A and B are in the same sector 
and identical in the composition of the workforce. Each has two sets of employees, 
managerial and manual. Firm A might, for example, be one of the many formerly state-
owned industrial companies which were privatised during the period of the UK Thatcher 
Government of the 1980s. In Firm A, the managerial employees are all covered by a job 
evaluation scheme and the manual employees all have their pay set by collective 
bargaining. Inequality in Firm A is entirely administered and the firm may be said to have 
oversight on the extent of inequality it manufactures.  In Firm B, job evaluation schemes 
do not extend to senior management, who are primarily rewarded by stock options, i.e. 
by reference to capital market measures. There is no collective bargaining and manual 
workers’ pay is set by reference to the legal minimum wage or movements thereof – i.e. 
the annual percentage increases in the minimum or living wage are applied to existing 
pay levels.  Other things equal, Firm B will have greater inequality than Firm A except 
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under circumstances where the absolute increases of those on the minimum wage 
calculus are greater than the capital market returns to those holding stock options; 
empirically, this has rarely occurred in the last 30 years.  
       However, there are limiting conditions. Where wage inflation is greater than stock 
market returns, as for much of the 1970s, then Firm B income inequality will not grow 
rapidly. Firm A senior management on a job-evaluated salary may be better off than firm 
B. For the USA for the immediate post war period, Lewellen (1968) identifies widespread 
use of stock options for executive pay, but nevertheless in the early 1950s production 
worker pay grew faster than executive compensation. Murphy (2011) makes the generic 
claim for the USA that under a combination of stagnant stock returns and high marginal 
taxation such as occurred in the 1970s, firms switch from direct rewards reportable during 
disclosure to less visible perks such as private jets and country club memberships, or to 
deferred compensations such as golden parachute exit packages and generous 
pensions. There is certainly empirical evidence of this during the high tax era of the 1970s 
when benefits such as company cars and employer provided housing were favourably 
treated for tax purposes. However, as we shall argue below, where price inflation is 
relatively low and increases in the value of equities is high, as has been the case since 
the financial crisis, then the pay mechanisms for Firm B will tend to generate greater 
dispersions on a number of measures.  
       What is likely in the UK, however, is that the institutional arrangements of Firm A 
have become much less common, and the institutional arrangements of Firm B more so. 
We referred above to the arrangements in Firm A as Administered Inequality. Firm B on 
the other hand may seem to be more market oriented in its pay setting arrangements. 
However, what the hypothetical example of Firm B illustrates is that it is not sufficient to 
make this broad contrast in order to understand trends in inequality within the firm. One 
needs to ask which market, capital or labour, is being relied upon to set pay? In Firm B, 
the two tails of the income distribution are related to different markets and market 
indicators. Let us examine each. 
 
 
4. Outsourced Inequality 
 
Two seminal articles published in the mid-1970s and early 1980s had a profound impact 
on academic thinking about executive compensation. Agency theory (the locus classicus 
is Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argued, inter alia, that in order to motivate executives 
(agents) to carry-out actions and select effort levels that are in the best interests of 
shareholders (principals), boards of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, must 
design incentive contracts which make an agent’s compensation contingent on 
measurable firm performance outcomes.  Tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) 
extended the agency model by proposing that principals structure a company’s 
management hierarchy as a rank-order tournament, thus ensuring that the highest-
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performing agents are selected for the most-senior management positions.  Tournament 
theory postulated that executives compete for places in a company’s upper echelons via 
a sequential elimination tournament. It predicted that compensation is an increasing 
convex function of an agent’s position in the management hierarchy, with increases in 
remuneration between levels in the hierarchy varying inversely in proportion to the 
probability of being promoted to the next level. By implication, the compensation of the 
CEO, ranked highest in the tournament, would typically be substantially more than the 
compensation of executives at the next highest level (for a more detailed review of agency 
and tournament theories, see Pepper, 2015). 
       The popularity of the two theories in academic circles was accompanied by changes 
in management practice, as an increasing proportion of senior executive pay was 
delivered in the form of stock options and other types of equity incentive.  The 
pervasiveness of these instruments was not even affected when, in a large scale 
empirical study in the US, Jensen and Murphy (1990) were unable to find a strong 
connection between CEO pay and performance, noting that CEOs lost only $3.25 for 
every $1,000 loss of firm value, an effective equity stake of just 0.3%.  Somewhat 
perversely, given that agency theory had been advanced as a positive theory (of what is) 
rather than a normative theory (of what should be) Jensen and Murphy concluded that 
the weak empirical connection between changes in CEO pay and changes in firm value 
meant that companies should be providing a greater proportion of compensation in the 
form of stock.  That is indeed what subsequently happened.  For example, in the UK the 
proportion of FTSE 100 CEO pay delivered in the form of stock options or long-term 
share-based incentive plans (LTIPS) increased from around 13% to 35% between 2000 
and 2015 (source: Income Data Services and PricewaterhouseCoopers).  The use of 
LTIPS in the UK was given further encouragement with the publication of the Greenbury 
Report in 1995, which recommended the use of long-term performance-based equity 
incentives to align the interests of shareholders and managers.   
       Paradoxically, however, senior executives have gradually become disillusioned with 
share-based incentives. Many executives feel that they fail to meet their main objectives.  
Various reasons are given.  Commonly cited is the complexity of most LTIPs.  In a study 
by Pepper, Gore, and Crossman (2013) one CEO is quoted as follows: 
Deferred share schemes are basically somewhat poorly understood, and pretty 
arbitrary.  In the old days share options were easily understood, but pretty arbitrary.  
These new schemes are extraordinarily complex… and still pretty arbitrary. 
Other participants in the same study comment on risk, ambiguity and time discounting.  
In another study, Pepper and Gore (2014) found that when it comes to their own finances 
executives were much more risk averse than financial theory predicts, preferring fixed 
outcomes to risky, yet potentially more rewarding, alternatives. They also attached a 
heavy discount to complex incentives. The second study found that executives are very 
high time discounters, typically marking-down the value of complex long-term incentives 
at a rate in excess of 30% per year, reducing the perceived face value of a three-year 
deferred incentive by over 65%.  Pepper & Gore conclude that the pervasiveness of 
shared-based incentives is actually contributing to inflation in executive pay. They 
 III Working paper 31                                           Paul Willman & Alexander Pepper 
 
12 
 
conjecture that boards of directors, acting on behalf of shareholders, increase the size of 
long-term incentive awards to executives to compensate them for the perceived loss of 
value when compared with less risky, more certain and more immediate forms of reward. 
       As evidence of these points, we provide data for the period 2000-2015 (see Figure 
1), a period what incidentally includes the financial crisis of 2008-9. In 2000 the median 
salary of FTSE100 CEOs was £538,000.  By 2015 this had risen to £927,000, an 
annualised growth rate of 3.1%.  During the same period FTSE100 CEO median total 
earnings increased from £962,145 to £4,052,000, an annualised increase of 10.1% 
(Income Data Services and authors’ calculations). The difference between these two 
rates of growth is largely attributable to the pervasive use of long-term share-based 
incentives, as well as significant increases in annual bonuses. For the purposes of 
comparison, during the same period the annualised increase in the retail prices index was 
2.8% and the annualised increase in average nominal earnings was 3.0%.  (source - UK 
Office for National Statistics). In 2015, the ratio of median total pay of FTSE100 CEOs to 
UK national average wages was 161:1 (£4,052,000 compared with £25,004). In 2000 the 
equivalent statistic was 59:1 (£962,145 compared with £16,172).  
 
FIGURE 1. FTSE 100 Senior Executives – Indicative Total Earnings 2000-2015 
 
                                                              Source of data: Income Data Services and PwC 
 
Thus it can be seen that in the UK, from the mid-1980s onwards, senior managers were 
increasingly being rewarded on capital market measures not evaluation of job inputs. At 
the same time, given the collapse of collective bargaining, many lower paid workers have 
had their income increases pegged to statutory measures, i.e. based on changes to the 
minimum wage. In these circumstances, administrative processes for the firm to regulate 
intra firm equity gave way to capital market and statutory influences in the tails of the 
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distribution respectively in such a way that the firm may not administratively control 
inequality within its boundaries.  
       The key statutory influence on all-employee pay in the UK is the national minimum 
wage (NMW), introduced in 1999.  Since then, it has been regularly increased at a rate 
above conventional cost of living indices but just below the growth of GDP.  Specifically, 
since its introduction in 1999, the NMW has increased by 86%, which is greater than the 
increase in average UK earnings (63%) and both influential measures of inflation (RPI 
57% and CPI 39%), but lower than the GDP (95%) (Low Pay Commission, 2016: 5). 
According to the Low Pay Commission (LPC), the coverage and influence of the NMW 
has gradually increased on a number of measures. The number of employees paid the 
NMW has increased. However, there is also evidence from survey data that the impact 
on those paid above the minimum wage is substantial. Bryson and Luchino (2014) use 
WERS data on pay settlements in the private sector to analyse this broader influence. 
They find that 30% of workplaces refer to changes in the NMW in considering the level of 
annual pay settlement. Large workplaces and those without unions are particularly likely 
to do so; a larger percentage of private sector employees than workplaces is affected. As 
a consideration, it ranks only behind the financial performance of the firm as an influence 
on employee pay increases. They argue that, in the absence of collective bargaining, the 
NMW steps in. They note that many firms have shifted their annual pay increase date to 
October, to coincide with the increase in the NMW. 
       The remit of the LPC which oversees NMW increases, is to assess the affordability 
to firms of a specific increase. This refers both to the impact on firm performance and also 
to employment levels. The concern is to avoid setting the NMW at levels that would cause 
increases in unemployment, particularly amongst vulnerable labour market groups.  It 
surveys employers and employers’ associations regularly and these surveys indicate that 
increases in the NMW tend to increase the “bite” of the statutory measure. By the term 
“bite” they mean the percentage of average or median earnings taken up by the NMW, 
and there is some evidence that where the NMW increases are higher, differentials 
among those close to the bottom of the income distribution tend to compress (LPC, 2016: 
21-23). The NMW is due to be explicitly targeted at 60% of median earnings by 2020. 
       Between 2000-2015 the income of FTSE 100 directors, lead or other, increased by 
over 300%. In the same period the adult NMW has increased by just over 80%. The 
relative movements of capital market and labour market indices are not the whole story. 
Executive pay movements during the period appear to be distressingly unaffected by the 
financial crash – see Figure 1 above - we explain why below. NMW measures have 
moved above both inflation measures.  However, the data indicate the importance of 
focusing on the different markets in which the pay of different sets of firm employees are 
set if we wish to understand the growth of intra firm inequality. Executive pay is set by 
formulae related ultimately to the movement of financial markets. Since pay rises (not 
necessarily pay levels) are set in many private sector firms by reference to NMW 
movements for those closer to the bottom of the income pyramid then, to the extent that 
capital market returns exceed inflation, the pay setting process themselves will tend to 
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increase intra firm income inequality measures over time. The figures on executive pay 
and low pay respectively from 2000 onwards bear this out. 
       We have referred to the pattern of income setting processes under managerial 
capitalism as “administered inequality”. We refer to this pattern of dual reliance on capital 
markets on the one hand and the statutory processes of the NMW on the other as 
“Outsourced Inequality”. The firm no longer co-ordinates the pay of the highest and lowest 
paid workers within its own boundaries. Coordination relies instead on market 
mechanisms, but the crucial thing is that it refers to different markets at either end of the 
income distribution. The production of inequality by the firm does not relate any longer, 
as it did under managerial capitalism, to a set of intra firm processes - it refers at the tails 
of the income distribution to different markets. We return to the implications of this in our 
conclusion. First, however, we need to address the issue of variation in intra-firm 
inequality measures and to the different operation of the two markets. 
 
 
5.    UK Data Regarding Intra-Firm Inequality 
 
The UK is widely regarded in Europe as having led the way when it comes to the 
disclosure of executive pay.  Disclosure of individual directors’ pay has been required for 
over 25 years and is now included in a directors’ remuneration report.   The Directors' 
Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 require that every quoted company submits a 
remuneration report to members at the company’s annual general meeting each year.  
This report gives full details of each director’s remuneration and is required to be 
presented in a way that is clear, transparent and understandable to shareholders.  The 
remuneration report must provide details of base salary, benefits, cash bonuses, long-
term incentives and pension contributions for each individual director.  Extensive 
disclosure of participation in employee share plans is also required.   Nevertheless, there 
are a number of problems.  First, it is increasingly the case among large UK companies 
that the CEO and CFO are the only executives who sit on the main board - other board 
members are typically all non-executive directors.  Senior executives sit on an executive 
committee, management board, or equivalent, to which the directors’ remuneration report 
regulations do not apply.  While a few companies voluntarily disclose details of the pay 
of senior executives who are not main board directors, the majority do not.   Secondly, 
the remuneration of all employees is generally only disclosed in aggregate, typically to 
date without any information about pay dispersionii.  While it has been possible to 
calculate mean pay and the ratio of mean pay to CEO total remuneration based on public 
information, median pay has not been provided as a matter of course and more 
sophisticated measures of pay dispersion are not currently required.  This means that a 
sophisticated evaluation of intra-firm inequality in UK companies is rarely, if ever, 
possible, given current regulations. In the USA, publication of the ratio of CEO to median 
pay, which is a somewhat better measure since the latter does not include the former, is 
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required by the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the calculations are complicated and the SEC 
has issued guidance on the regulations on the pay ratio ruleiii.    
       Table 1 compares the ratio of average CEO to average pay for FTSE 100 companies 
in 2015 broken down by a simple industry measure (Standard Industry Classification). 
The data excludes pure investment companies; in addition one company, WPP plc, has 
been excluded because of the distorting effect of the staggeringly high pay of its CEO - 
£70.4 million in 2015. The variance on multiples is substantial, from under 59 to over 294. 
This is in some ways surprising. The variance is likely, we submit, to be driven by both 
the denominator and the numerator.  By 2015, most CEOs of FTSE 100 companies were 
on substantially leveraged stock based reward packages, and simple inspection of the 
industry categories reveal that this variance is unlikely to be explained by variance in the 
value of such packages. Consider the two sectors of real estate investment (multiple just 
under 60) with food, beverage and tobacco manufacturing (multiple nearly 300).  In 
manufacturing, employing around 70,000 staff, average staff pay is relatively modest 
(around £28,000) whereas average CEO pay is very high, compared with the FTSE100 
CEO average, at over £7.6 million.  (Admittedly the latter figure is affected by the high 
pay of one CEO, at Reckitt Benckiser, whose total pay in 2015 was over £23 million; 
adjusting for this figure, average CEO pay in food, beverage and tobacco manufacturing 
is around £5.4 million, which is much closer to the FTSE100 CEO average). This is still 
much higher than CEO pay in real estate investment, average £3.0 million, but average 
employee pay in that sector is also higher, at just over £52,000. The banking and asset 
management ratio of 93:1 combines relatively low ratios in investment banking (high 
average earnings) and high ratios in retail banking (comparatively low average earnings). 
       The most obvious point to make here is the ease with which firms may manipulate 
the figures on intra-firm inequality that can be calculated from publicly available data in 
the UK.  There are in fact at least two possibilities. The first is to outsource low paid work.  
Many of the industries in the top half of the table certainly do so. Those in the bottom half 
of the table, for example in general retailing, find it harder to do so and contain many 
employees paid at or close to the NMW. The second is to reduce the executive 
compensation figures, either those that are paid or those that are published. 
       Again consider a hypothetical example to illustrate this dynamic.  In 2015 Firm A and 
Firm B both paid their CEO £1,000,000. Firm A has average pay at the UK average 
(approximately £27,000). Firm B has average pay at the UK minimum wage for a 35-hour 
week (approximately £12,000). Firm A shows a multiple of CEO to average worker pay 
of under 40 and Firm B over 80.  This may point to the importance of different occupational 
structures as an influence on intra firm inequality. However, it also indicates the 
importance of choice of firm boundaries.  
       Let us take two specific examples of prominent firms in the FTSE 100 in general 
retailing and financial services respectively in 2015. We adapt the raw data used in Figure 
2 in two ways. First, we extract CEO pay from the figure for total pay. Secondly, we extract 
employers’ social security contributions from the total pay bill. Tesco, one of the largest 
UK retailers has a very wide range of income to judge from the multiple; this was 269 in 
2015. It has senior managers on heavily leveraged stock packages (which are “highly 
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competitive” to judge from the business press). It also employs many people in stores on 
minimum or living wage, in activities such as shelf stocking and checkout. Barclays is in 
financial services - its multiple for the same year is lower, at 54. In 2015, average pay at 
Tesco was £15,369 - the Barclays average was £67,676. CEO pay at Tesco was £4.1 
million, that at Barclays £3.7 million. So, much of the difference in the multiple is 
accounted for by the denominator. Two of the lowest multiples in the FTSE 100 are also 
financial companies (3i and Admiral Insurance).  It should be noted that CEO total 
remuneration is based on the “single figure” required by Companies Act 2006.  This 
includes the value of long-term incentives vesting during the year, and is not “smoothed” 
in any way.  
 
TABLE 1. FTSE100 Pay Ratios by SIC code, 2015 
INDUSTRY GROUP NUMBER OF COMPANIES 
AVERAGE 
PAY RATIO 
AVERAGE STAFF 
NUMBERS 
AVERAGE    
STAFF PAY 
AVERAGE      
CEO PAY 
Real estate 4 59 20128 £58,703 £3,019,542 
Electricity & water 4 75 14240 £44,942 £3,034,425 
Manufacturing – excluding 
food & beverages 11 77 33784 £50,883 £3,233,318 
Oil & gas 4 82 56051 £85,092 £6,736,926 
Professional, scientific & 
technical 6 82 28804 £54,059 £3,636,377 
Insurance 8 85 18481 £53,451 £3,968,336 
Banking & asset 
management 11 93 39284 £85,240 £5,581,563 
Wholesale & distribution 4 100 22189 £37,398 £3,743,600 
Construction 4 113 4118 £61,323 £7,011,053 
Telecoms 2 115 178467 £50,457 £5,879,000 
Hotel accommodation & 
food services 3 121 27797 £41,343 £3,005,333 
Mining & quarrying 6 133 51066 £52,035 £3,668,395 
Pharmaceuticals 4 148 43507 £64,898 £9,543,908 
Air & water transportation 4 173 186764 £39,517 £5,156,763 
Medi & information  3 179 45973 £47,307 £7,890,416 
Retail trade 7 189 134131 £19,767 £3,669,451 
Manufacturing - food, 
beverages, & tobacco  8 294 69027 £28,202 £7,653,213 
                                                                                                       Source: These Authors 
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       For the 94 non-investment companies in the FTSE 100, average pay in 2015 stood 
at £52,233. This is high - it is more than twice UK average earnings in 2015. It is consistent 
with the proposition that many firms on the list outsource low-paid activities, and thus they 
disappear from the calculations possible from public data. Outsourcing non-core activities 
in this way has become standard operational practice which the capital markets welcome 
as value-enhancing.  Conveniently, of course, it also helps to disguise intra-firm inequality 
by shifting the legal boundaries of the firm. These UK examples are probably not extreme 
- it is almost certain that any measure of similar multiples for the Apple or Nike global 
supply chain would be much broader than one confined to Apple or Nike employees.  
 
 
FIGURE 2. FTSE100 CEO to Employee Average Pay Ratios, 2015 
                                          
S                                                                Source: These Authors 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution in the ratio of CEO to average pay for the 94 non-
investment companies in the FTSE 100 for 2015. The majority of ratios are less than 
100:1, but one is greater 1000:1. This is WPP plc, which had a ratio of 1408:1 as a 
consequence of its very high CEO compensation (£70.4 million) compared with average 
pay at WPP of £50,024iv. The second highest multiple is Reckitt Benckiser (824:1) where 
the CEO was paid £23,190,985 and average earnings were much lower, at £28,150. 
Average CEO compensation for FTSE 100 companies in 2015 was £5,600,000. 
       Given that in absolute terms the variance at the top is much greater than at the 
bottom for these companies, the positive numerator effect on the pay ratio is strong 
(Pearson correlation significant at .001). However, the denominator effect is also 
significant (.01). There is also an employment size effect (positive at 0.05). This is evident 
in other data sets (Mueller, Ouimet, & Simintzi, 2015). We suggest that, given the high 
level of average earnings in FTSE 100 companies (twice the UK average), they engage 
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in outsourcing of low paid jobs where possible, and that a substantial part of the variance 
in pay ratios within the FTSE 100 relates to this. 
       The final major issue to address using these data concerns the operation of the link 
between CEO pay and capital market movements. Figure 1 showed the movements in 
FTSE 100 senior pay from 2000-2015. Lead executives do better in this period than 
others, but all show consistent increases. This is remarkable in that the period covers two 
major crashes. The FTSE index was hit by the dot.com crash fallout - its 2000 average 
was not reached again until 2007. Subsequently the FTSE 100 index was hit by the global 
financial crash, the effect of which was that the pre-crash high of 2007 was not exceeded 
until 2013. Over the entire period 2000-2015, the increase in the index is only 0.3%. The 
increase in FTSE 100 CEO pay is over 300%. Is it then reasonable to say that executive 
compensation relates to capital market movements? Other theories, some of them 
conspiratorial, also exist.  
Executive equity based incentives work in a particular way. Their underlying structure is 
effectively that of an option. Specifically, they do not go negative in value, since under 
those circumstances the option would not be exercised. Put another way, they are a one-
way bet - if the stock price goes up, they increase in value, but they do not reflect falls in 
the stock price. In Table 2, Column 2 shows the raw index and Column 3 the percentage 
changes. In Column 4 we register all falls at zero and count only aggregate increases - 
on this basis, the increase-only change for the FTSE 2000-2015 is 103.7%. This is just 
under half the CEO pay increase. 
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TABLE 2. CEO Pay and Upward Capital Market Movements 
 
  FTSE100 INDEX   FTSE 100 CEO 
YEAR INDEX 
YEAR ON 
YEAR 
CHANGE 
INCREASES 
ONLY 
THREE 
YEAR 
CHANGE 
INCREASES 
ONLY   PAY 
YEAR ON 
YEAR 
CHANGE 
2015 6242 -4.93%     0.00%   5.83%   5.83%  £4,052,000   -2.49% 
2014 6566 -2.71%     0.00% 17.84% 17.84%  £4,155,480   -3.00% 
2013 6749 14.43%   14.43% 14.39% 14.39%  £4,284,000    5.53% 
2012 5898   5.85%     5.85%   8.96%   8.96%  £4,059,334   -0.90% 
2011 5572 -5.56%     0.00% 25.67% 25.67%  £4,096,295     2.83% 
2010 5900   9.00%     9.00%   -8.63%   0.00%  £3,983,493   17.37% 
2009 5413 22.08%    22.08% -12.99%   0.00%  £3,393,953    3.75% 
2008 4434 -31.33%     0.00% -21.09%   0.00%  £3,271,129  38.38% 
2007 6457    3.79%     3.79% 34.13% 34.13%  £2,363,921    6.71% 
2006 6221  10.71%    10.71% 38.95% 38.95%  £2,215,346   12.68% 
2005 5619  16.72%    16.72% 42.61% 42.61%  £1,966,000   22.79% 
2004 4814    7.53%     7.53%  -7.72%   0.00%  £1,601,150   34.21% 
2003 4477  13.63%    13.63% -28.06%   0.00%  £1,193,000 -10.37% 
2002 3940 -24.48%    0.00% -43.15%   0.00%  £1,331,000   28.85% 
2001 5217 -16.17%    0.00% -11.32%   0.00%  £1,033,000    7.36% 
2000 6223 -10.20%    0.00% 21.16% 21.16%      £962,145    8.79% 
TOTAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE  
    8.36% 103.74% 76.60% 209.55%   172.49% 
AVERAGE CHANGE PER YEAR 
    0.83%     6.48%   4.42%   12.73%     10.94% 
                                                                                                       Source: These Authors 
 
However, most LTIPs for this set of firms typically work on a three-year cycle. If we 
calculate the increase only figure for the FTSE 100 on a three-year basis and eliminate 
falls, we get a total increase over the period of 209.6% (see Table 2, column 6), which 
compares with the CEO pay increase of 172.49%. Expressed annually, on the three-year 
increase only basis, CEO pay goes up 10.94% per annum compared to the index at 
12.73% per annum. This is a rather crude calculation, but we would argue it is consistent 
with the idea that CEO pays increases are linked only to upward movements in capital 
market indices. 
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6.  Discussion 
 
Where firms account for a very high proportion of total employment in an economy, then 
intra- and inter-firm inequality become important in explanations of societal inequality. We 
have limited our focus here to a discussion of intra-firm inequality which, on all measures, 
has increased in the last few decades. The literature on inequality in the firm has 
approached this in terms of a move from organisationally focused systems for setting 
employee income to market based processes.  We have followed this logic a little further. 
Where firms produce inequality by overseeing a system of income determination that is 
designed within the firm and insulated from market pressures, we have spoken of 
“administered inequality”. The premise for this is of course that the firm may appropriate 
rents and then redistribute them according to a system defined by organisational 
processes internal to the firm, specifically job evaluation and collective bargaining, both 
of which tend to compress income differentials. We have characterised this circumstance 
as a feature of managerial capitalism, in which accountability to markets is limited.  
       There is a substantial literature describing or asserting the end of managerial 
capitalism and the emergence of more market accountability, visible in a number of ways 
but specifically for our purposes in the exposure of employment systems more rigorously 
to market processes. Greater intra-firm inequality is seen to emerge from this. It may well 
be the case that markets generate more inequality than hierarchies (Kay, 2003). 
However, our argument, which we have illustrated with UK pay data, is that it is not 
enough to talk about market influence. One has to ask – which market? A peculiarity of 
the current system is that different groups of employees are exposed to different sets of 
market influences.  
       We have focused primarily on the tails of the intra-firm income distribution in the UK.  
In the right tail, incomes are defined in terms of capital market measures. In the left tail, 
incomes are defined increasingly in terms of statutory mechanisms such as the NMW. 
There are a variety of linkages to market indices in both cases, but generically executive 
pay is defined in terms of increases in the price of common stock of the employing firm 
and lower paid workers are tied to increases in the NMW. Neither of these sets of indices 
is easily controlled by the firm, hence we have used the term “outsourced inequality” to 
describe a system in which the firm no longer “makes” inequality but “takes” it. The firm 
is no longer in control of rent distribution to the same extent as under managerial 
capitalism. 
       We spoke of the disintegration of administered inequality processes such as job 
evaluation and collective bargaining that, we argued, tended to compress income 
distributions by subjecting them to internal oversight. The question thus arises – what 
organisational processes have replaced them? Unsurprisingly, the answer is 
fragmentation and lack of any unified oversight. In the absence of collective bargaining, 
pay determination for the lower paid in the firm tends to be the responsibility of the human 
resources department, not normally in the UK a main Board function, which may find that 
the anchoring of pay increases in a statutory process legitimises firm decisions . By 
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contrast, the pay of senior executives is set by a firm’s remuneration committee, the 
primary accountability of which is to shareholders. The two pay-setting mechanisms are 
not generally co-ordinated. One result is increasing intra-firm inequality, corresponding to 
the general rise in wealth inequality in the later part of the 20th century and early part of 
the 21st century which has been highlighted by Piketty (2013), Atkinson (2014) and others. 
       However, our argument differs from that of Piketty in terms of the precise processes 
in operation. Piketty’s argument is that it is impossible to measure the marginal 
contribution of each “super-manager”, as he calls them, to a firm’s total output. Their 
remuneration is therefore determined by hierarchical superiors or, at the top level, by 
compensation committees comprising non-executives who are, or were, senior 
executives in other companies, where they have also been in receipt of very high 
earnings.   In saying this, Piketty is therefore following the “managerial power” hypothesis, 
the proposition that an elite group of managers in effect determines its own pay on a tacit 
reciprocal “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” principle, originally advanced by 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004). 
       Piketty comments that top pay is determined in the context of a social norm of 
“meritocratic extremism” which has become prevalent in modern society, led by the US – 
the apparent need to designate certain individuals in all forms of life as “winners” and to 
reward them according.  He also points to the decrease in the very high top levels of 
income tax in the US and UK after 1980, which provided an incentive for senior executives 
to seek higher pay awards, knowing that they would retain a much greater share of their 
total remuneration. 
       Our argument is, perhaps paradoxically, that the decline in managerial capitalism, 
itself a period of almost complete managerial autonomy from investors, has led to an 
increase in intra firm inequality. Managers have become more subject to capital market 
oversight, but those senior managers who have their remuneration set to capital 
measures have benefited both absolutely and relatively to a substantial degree. 
       Our focus here has been on the firm, and intra-organisational processes, to which 
there are at least two possible sets of objections. The first is that overall inequality is less 
affected by intra-firm issues and more by inter-firm differences in income which relate to 
inter-firm differences in productivity. There is evidence both from UK and US data to 
support this (Faggio, Salvanes, & Van Reenen, 2010; Song, Price, Guvenen, & Bloom, 
2015). No doubt such differences are important, but we would argue that once one 
considers executive stock options (which Faggio et al do not), then the picture changes, 
because of the extreme movements in executive pay. A further point to make is that if 
large firms, such as those in the FTSE100 index, outsource low paid and low productivity 
work, intra-firm processes generate inter-firm pay differences. 
       The second issue concerns the importance of the intra-firm processes themselves. 
Autor (2014) has argued that the main factor in explaining the rise in wage inequality has 
been changes in the return to skills. Mueller et al. (2015) using UK data on job inputs, 
show both that the skill premium has increased, and that the proportional difference in 
pay between skill groups grows as firms get larger. They also argue that international 
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differences in wage inequality can be related to different levels of firm growth.  The rise 
in intra firm inequality may thus have happened whether the processes of administered 
inequality stood or fell. Thus we would argue that the collapse of managerial capitalism 
is best seen as a precursor to, rather than consequence of, rising intra-firm inequality.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have focused on intra firm financial inequalities, both because they show a pattern of 
long term increase and because that increase has become a matter of public and 
government concern. The specific measure we have chosen is the publicly available one 
in UK; the ratio of CEO pay to the average. We have traced the growth in inequality on 
this measure to changes in the processes of determination of pay; we have described 
this as a move from administered to outsourced inequality.  
       The two key characteristics of the latter, more modern, situation are first, that 
executive pay achieves escape velocity from intra-organisational pay comparisons 
because it is based on capital market measures and, second, that the option structure of 
executive pay packages makes this a one way, upward, bet such that executive pay 
outstrips capital market index measures.  
       Regulation or even effective normative pressures on such inequality measures may 
be compromised by the ease with which firms may outsource low pay. Compliance with 
any guideline or requirement may be dealt with by firms not by reducing inequality but by 
moving organisational boundaries. The sectoral data suggest the ability to do this may 
vary between firms and sectors. In some cases, understanding the extent of inequality 
manufactured by a firm may require he examination of the entire global supply chain.
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Notes   
i
 There is a separate and equally important question about how best to measure intra-firm inequality 
and inter-firm variances in inequality.  Multiples, as referenced here, are easy to calculate but 
potentially misleading.  More sophisticated measures, for example organisational-level equivalents 
of Gini coefficients or Atkinson inequality indices, are complex and impossible to calculate based 
on published information.  
ii
 It should be noted that new regulations requiring the disclosure of pay ratios in the UK were 
introduced in 2018.  The new requirements apply to companies reporting on financial years 
starting on or after 1 January 2019.  Quoted companies registered in the UK with more than 250 
UK employees will be required to publish the ratio of their CEO’s single figure total remuneration to 
the median, 25th and 75th percentile total remuneration of their full-time equivalent UK employees.  
iii
 New regulations requiring the disclosure of pay ratios in the UK were introduced in 2018.  The new 
requirements apply to companies reporting on financial years starting on or after 1 January 2019.  
Quoted companies registered in the UK with more than 250 UK employees will be required to 
publish the ratio of their CEO’s single figure total remuneration to the median, 25th and 75th 
percentile total remuneration of their full-time equivalent UK employees. 
iii
 Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (the 
Dodd-Frank Act) required the SEC to design rules to implement the requirement that a public 
corporation should disclose the ratio between the total compensation of the CEO and all other 
employees.  After some debate and consultation, especially over total compliance costs, the SEC 
adopted final rules for pay ratio disclosure on 5 August 2015.  The rule addresses concerns about 
the costs of compliance by providing companies with flexibility in meeting the rule’s 
requirements.  In particular: (a) a company will be permitted to select its methodology for 
identifying its median employee and that employee’s compensation, including through statistical 
sampling of its employee population or other reasonable methods;  (b) the median employee can 
be identified once every three years and the company can choose a determination date within the 
last three months of its fiscal year, i.e., the calculation does not have to be done at the balance 
sheet date; (c) non-US employees from countries in which data privacy laws or regulations make 
companies unable to comply with the rule can be excluded. The SEC issued interpretive guidance 
to assist companies in their efforts to comply with the pay ration rule on 21 September 2017 (see 
SEC press release 2017-172) 
iv
 Sir Martin Sorrell, who was CEO from 1986 to 2018, left WPP in 2018. His replacement, Read, 
was reported to be receiving a pay package of around £7m per annum. 
                                                          
